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·In the SUpreffie Court 
of the State of Utah 
COM~1ERCIAL BANI{ OF UTAH, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
STATE OF UTAH AND ROY W. 
SIM~IONS as Bank C01nmissioner 
for the State of Utah, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 7636 
BRIEF OF APPELL~T 
STATE1IENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs brought this action in the district court 
to recover certain sums paid by it under protest to the 
defendant, bank commissioner of the State of Utah, under 
the provisions of Sections 7-1-11, 7-1-11X, and 7-3-6, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, on the theory that these statutes, 
under which such sums were assessed and collected, are 
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unconstitutional as- ·being- in contravention of -Article 
XIII, Sections 2, 3 and· 11, Article I, Section -24 and 
Article VI, Section 23, of the Constitution of Utah. De-
fendants admitted the assessment and payment of the 
sum in question, but denied the invalidity of the statutes. 
A stipulation of facts was filed and testimony was taken 
in the trial. The district court awarded judgment for 
the plaintiff as was prayed and the defendants are here 
on appeal frmn this judgment. The trial court ruled that 
Article VI, Section 23, Utah Constitution, was not vio-
lated in the passage of the acts in question, and we there-
fore do not discuss that issue here. 
The isssue of this case is the validity of the legisla-
tive arrangement for support of the banking department, 
known as the "financial institutions' fund." This fund 
consists of certain collections made from financial in-
stitutions under the supervision of the banking depart-
lnent according to a graduated schedule based upon th2 
aggregate assets of such institutions, as set forth in Sec-
tion 7-1-11; Utah Code Annotated 1943. Under the provi-
sions of Section 7 -1-11X, Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
these collections are paid by the bank commissioner into 
the state treasurer and constitute a separate and distinct 
fund known as the "financial institutions' fund." Bien-
nially the legislature appropriates fron1 this fund to the 
banking department for the cost of administration of 
that departn1ent. (R. 8) The legislature has provided 
that any sums in excess of $25,000.00 shall at the end of 
each fiscal year revert from the financial institutions' 
fund to the general fund of the State, Section 7-1-llX, 
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Utah Code Annotated 1943. The record shows that only 
one such transfer from the financial institutions' fund 
to the general fund has in fact been made. ( R. 9, 13, 63) 
The plaintiff banking corporation is a branch or 
"chain" connnercial and savings bank system, organized 
in 1948, consisting of a hon1e office, with branches lo-
cated in Delta, Heber, Nephi, Payson, and Spanish Fork, 
"Gtah. The hon1e office is located in Spanish Fork. (R. 
8) The stipulation of facts states that, according to the 
articles of incorporation, the home office at Spanish Fork 
does not carry on active commercial or savings bank 
activities, but serves merely as a central managerial con-
trol point for the operation of the five branches. (R. 7) 
The entire banking system in the year 1949 carried ag-
gregate assets in the amount of $11,828,949.16. (R. 8) 
Under the provisions of Sections 7-3-6 and 7-1-11, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, the bank commissioner assessed 
against the Commercial Bank of Utah fees under the 
following schedule. (R. 11) : 
Spanish Fork :Nlain Office ________ $11,828,949.16 $1,000.00 
Spanish Fork Office --------------------$ 2, 707,645.69 
plus 10% -------------------------------- 270,764.57 $ 500.00 
$ 2,978,410.26 
Delta Office------------------------------------$ 1,709,302.65 
plus 10% -------------------------------- 170,930.27 
$ 1,880,232.92 $ 400.00 
Payson Office --------------------------------$ 1,783,016.83 
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Heber Or£ ice-· -~~------~;_·_:; ____ -____ :~---~----:"$ ·1,923,581. 7-6 
plus 10% -------------------------------- 192,358.18 
$ 2,115,939.94 $ 500.00 
Nephi Office --------------------------------$ 2, 751,819.83 
plus 10% -------------------------------- 275,181.99 
$ 3,027,001.82 $ 650.00 
$3,450.00 
This schedule of fees was arrived at by the bank 
commissioner under that portion of Section 7-3-6, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, which provides: 
"The same requirements for examination of 
branch banks shall apply as for any other banks 
and the bank commissioner shall collect for the ex-
amination of each such branch bank the fee required 
for the examination of any bank of like size and in 
computing such fee the capital of such branch 
shall be considered to be one-tenth of the total 
liabilities carried at such branch; prov·ided, tlw.t 
in no case shall the fee for the- examination of a 
branch be less than $40. rrhis shall not in any wa~T 
affect the amount of fees to be paid for an ex-
amination of the main office of any bank having 
branches." 
The actual computation of the fees is not in issue, 
but rather the legality of the fees as thus computed. 
A considerable portion of the testimony taken at the 
trial was intended to show that the services rendered hy 
the bank departn1ent in its examination and supervision 
of the plaintiff does not bear a direct relationship to the 
fees charged. The answer to this problem is given in the 
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sixteenth paragraph of the Stipulation of Facts (R. 10), 
which we quote: 
.. That because of factors which vary fron1 ex-
mnination to exmnination and institution to in-
stitution, there is not necessarily a correlation be-
tween the an10unt of the fee charged by the State 
Bank Conunissioner for any particular year and 
the work actually perfor1ned by the State Banking 
Deparhnent in its examining and supervisory 
capacity during the period. Some of these vari-
able factors are: the gener~l econ01nic condition 
of the area served by the institution; a compari-
son of the bank exa1nined with a bank of similar 
size in other parts of the state and district ; com-
parison of examined banks with other banks of 
following ratios: percent of total assets to cash 
and balances with other banks, V. S. Government 
assets, total capital accounts; percent of total 
loans classified by the exmniner as being past 
due, sub-standard, doubtful, or im1nediate loss; 
the type, size and number of loans made (for ex-
ample, less time is consu1ned in exan1ining where 
there are·ten well secured loans of $10,000.00 each 
than where there are 100 loans of $1,000.00 each 
secured by a variety of collateral, each of which 
must be separately analyzed); that the an1ounts 
charged as fees are based on aggregate assets 
as set forth in Sections 7-1-11 and 7-3-G, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943." 
It was further stipulated that the exmnination of 
the plaintiff, in the year 1949, was made in conjunction 
with the examiners fr01n the Federal Reserve Syste1n 
who did a portion of the work of. exmnining. ( R. 7) rrhe 
record further shows that where a financial institution 
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is -under·· the .. jurisdiction of ·.the bank coniinission, and 
in addition thereto a member of the Federal Reserve 
System, it is the general practice of the banking depart-
ment to examine such institutions in collaboration with 
the Federal Reserve examiners. (R. 28 ff.) The depart-
ment further accepts and uses reports of examinations 
by the Federal Deposits Insurance Corporation. (R. 30) 
Prior to consolidation of the five banks into a branch 
system, it was not necessary that the examination of 
eaeh of these banks be conducted simultaneaously; how-
ever, because of th~ consolidation, good bank examining 
practic~s require ~uch simultaneous examination. (R. 
28) _Furthermore_, consolidation gave the plaintiff 
marked advantages in the banking business. (R. 49) 
The financial in~titution~ fund, as it existed at the 
time this case was brought, was creat.~cl. in .1933 and is 
found in the statut~ now known as Section 7-1-11X:, Utah 
Cod~ 1\:r;t;notated 1943. We quote that section: 
"All fees accruing to the banking department 
as hereinbefore provided in this act shall be pairl 
by the bank cominissioner into the state treasurer 
monthly, and shall constitute 11 separate and dis-
tinct fund which shall be known as the financial 
institutions fund. All expenses incurred and all 
compensation paid by the department in the ad-
ministration of this act shall be paid out of the 
financial institutions fund upon order of the 
·conimission on vouchers approved by the state 
auditor. No part of such fund shall revert to the 
general fu;nd of the state ~t the close of any fiscal 
year until such fund shall mnount to $25,000 in 
which event any amount in .such fund in excess 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of $25,000 shall revert to the general-fund at .the 
end of each fiscal year." 
The record shows that this fund remained below the 
$25,000.00 maximuin until the inflationary period follow-
ing "\Y orld "\Y ar II. ( R. 13) It also shows that under the 
reverting clause of the statute cited above,_ only one 
transfer has been made from that fund to the general 
fund of the State. (R. 9) At the same time the record 
shows that the banking department, because of the failure 
on the part of the legislature to appropriate sufficient 
sums to it fr01n that fund, has not been able to carry 
out fully the duties imposed upon it by the law. ·(R. 14, 
29-30) 
As stated earlier, the issue of this case is the con-
stitutionality of those statutes establishing the. fees of 
the financial institutions under the supervi_sion of. the 
banking department and creating the financial insti-
tutions fund. Plaintiff alleged .in its ~omplaint that th~ 
fees charged it under those statutes for the year 1949 
were illegally and unlawfully assessed· because those 
statutes, Sections 7-1-10, 7-1-11, 7 -1-11X, and 7-3-6, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, are unconstitutional ~n that they 
violate Article XIII, Sections 2, 3,· and 11, Article 1, 
Section 24~ and Article VI, Section 23, Utah Constitution. 
As stated earlier, the trial court foi.tnd no vi.ol~tion of 
Article VI, Section 23. The t~eory. upon which· ~his un-
constitutionality is alleged is that these fees are in fact 
an ad valoren1 or direct property tax, duplicitous in 
nature. Defendants denied this ·allegatio~ on the theory 
that the ,legislature has the authorityto ~s-tablish and pro.,. 
·~ 
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vide·· for the eolleeti:on of these fees· under Article· XIII, 
Section 1~, of the Utah Co-nstitution, which states~· 
"Nothing in this Constitution shall be con-
strued to prevent the Legislature from providing 
a stamp tax, or a tax based on income, occupa-
tion, licenses, or franchises." 
The trial court, after making its findings of fact, en-
tered the following conclusions of law. (R. 62): 
(1) That the sum of $3,450.00 was illegally 
and unlawfully assessed and collected by the de-
fendant from the plaintiff. 
(2) That Sections 7-1-11 and 7-3-6, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, are in contravention of 
Article XIII, Sections 2, 3, and 11 and Article I, 
Section 24 of the Constitution of Utah .. 
( 3) That said Sections 7-1-11 and 7-3-6 do 
not prescribe or establish a valid occupation, li-
cense or franchise tax under the provisions of 
-Article XIII, Section 12 of the Constitution of 
Utah. 
(4) That Sections 7-1-11 and 7-3-6, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, do not establish a valid 
regulatory or licence tax or fee. 
(5) That the plaintiff should have judgment 
against the defendants in the amount of $3,450.00 
and for its costs. 
and thereupon entered its judgment accordingly. 
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(1) \\1lether the charges against financial insti .. 
tutions under the supervision of the banking depl\rt~ 
ment, established by Sections 7-1-11 and 7-3-6, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, are in fact ad valore1n or property taxes, 
or exci8es in the for1n of occupation or license fees and, 
(2) if the latter, whether the charges. made against 
the plaintiff banking corporation under those statutes 
are so unreasonable as to render those statutes void. 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
I. 
CHARGES l\IADE AGAINST FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE BANKING 
DEPARTMENT, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SEC-
TIONS 7-1-11 and 7-3-6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1943, 
DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN AD VALOREM OR PROPERTY 
TAX, BUT RATHER, ARE AN OCCUPATION OR LICENSE 
FEE, SO THAT THEY COME WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF 
ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 12, OF THE UTAH CONSTITU-
TION. 
II. 
THE FEES ESTABLISHED FOR 'FINANCIAL INSTI-
TUTIONS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF. J'JtE BANKING 
DEPARTMENT DO NOT VIOLATE ''rilE' UNIF~ORMITY OF 
OPERATION OF LAWS REQUIREMENT OF :THE CONS1'1-
TUTION. ,·~ · 
III. 
THE DIFFERENCE , IN FE~S- ~CHA~GED ., JH~AiN,CH 
BANKING SYSTEMS, AS OPPOSED TO NON BRANCH 
BANKS, UNDER SECTION 7-3-6, UTAH .CODE ANNOTATED 
1943, DOES NOT RENDER THAT SECTION VOID. 
11 
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. ·. .: ARGUMENT-~-. 
I._ . 
CHARGES MADE AGAINST FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS UNDER THE •· SUPERVISION OF T.HE BANKING 
DEPARTMENT, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SEC-
TIONS 7-1-11 and 7 .. 3-6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1943, 
DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN AD VALOREM OR PROPERTY 
TAX, BUT RATHER, ARE AN OCCUPATION OR LICENSE 
FEE, SO THAT THEY COME WITHIN THE PROVJSIONS OF 
ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 12, OF THE UTAH CONSTITU-
'l'IQN. 
We recognize the rule that, whether a charge made 
by the State is a direct property tax or an excise, fran-
chise, occupation or license· tax, depends upon the inci-
dents of the particular tax or fee, and not upon what 
the legislature 6r anyone else calls it. However, it is 
our position that the fees charged plaintiff under Sec-
tions 7-1-11 and 7~3-6, Utah Code Annotated 1943, are 
not, because of their very incidents, subject to the pro-
visions of Article XIII, Sections 2, 3, and 11, Utah Consti-
tution. Those sections, so far as material here, provide: 
Art. XIII, 2 : "All tangible property in the 
State, not exempt under the laws of the United 
States, or under this constitution, shall be taxed 
in proportion to its value, to be ascertained a:5 
provided by law. * * *" 
Art. XIII, 3: "The Legislature shall provide 
by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment and 
taxation on all tangible property- in the State, 
according to its value in rnoney, and shall pre-
scribe by: law such regulations as shall secure a 
just valuation for taxation of such property, so 
12 
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. : that ·every person and co-rporatio~ shall pay a tax 
in proportion to the value of his, her, 9:t its tan-
gible property; •. * * Intangible property may be 
exempted from taxation as property or it may be 
taxed in such a manner and to such extent as the 
Legislature may provide. Provided that if in-
tangible property be taxed as property the rate 
thereof shall not exceed five mills on each dollar 
of valuation. When exempted from taxation as 
property, the taxable- income therefrmn shall he 
taxed under any tax based on incomes, but when 
taxed by the State of Utah as property, the income 
therefrom shall not also be taxed. * * ., 
Art. XIII, 11: "***The State Tax Commis-
sion shall administer and supervise the tax laws 
of the State** *." 
Art. I, 24: "All laws of a general nature 
shall have uniform operation., 
Article XIII, Section 12, -provides : 
"Nothing in this Constitution shall be con:-
strued to prevent the Legislature from providing 
a stamp tax, or a tax based on income, occupa-
tion, licenses or franchises." 
In construing this last cited section· of the Utah Consti-
tution, this court, in the case of Salt Lake City v. Chris-
tensen Co., 34 Utah 38, 42, 95 Pac. 523, 17 LRA (NS) 898, 
(1909) stated: 
"By adopting [Article XIIIJ se_ction 12, as we 
view it, the framers of the Constitution neither 
intended to, nor did they, in any way place a limit-
ation upon the power of the LegislatureJo irnpose 
the several kinds of taxes specified in that section . 
. Out of abundance_ of caution,. however, the ~ramers 
-U 
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of the Constitution said that nothing therein 
should be construed as to prevent the Legislature 
from impo·sing and enforcing the said taxes. 
"Having thus eliminated from the 'Consti-
tution altogether the several kinds of taxes speci-
fied in section 12, it is reasonable to suppose that 
''the framers of that instrument nevertheless in-
tended to provide for the conditions upon which 
such taxes should b,e imposed by a reference to 
· other parts of the same instrument~ The framers 
of- the Constitution imposed certain duties, and 
with them certain specified restrictions, upon the 
Legislature, but in section 12 neither duties nor 
restrictions of any kind are mentioned. All that 
was intended, and all that was there said, was that 
. D{)thing that had been said on the subject of tax-
ation should be construed so as to in any way 
curtail .the,. power of the Legislature with regard 
to license or occupation taxes. In other words, 
, the-framers of the Constitution desired to impress 
upon alLthat no restriction upon the Legislature 
should be implied from what had been before 
written in that instrument upon the special sub-
. ject of taxation referred to in section 12. "\Ve are 
of the opinion, therefore, that the right to impose 
occupation and license taxes and other subjects 
of taxation mentioned in section 12 was left, and 
clearly intended to be left, where it always was, 
namely, with the Legislature, to be applied and 
controlled as to it might seem just and proper." 
·:CQ~lcerning. the objection that the ordinance under con-
sideration violated the equality and uniformity of laws 
provision of the· Constitution, this court went on to say: 
"Independently of the constitutional excep-
-~ _;, .. tion above discussed, the courts have frequently 
14 
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· passed upon and applied the general constitutional 
provision demanding equality and uniformity of 
'·taxation. The decisions are almost, if not quite, 
unanimous that the constitutional provision which 
hnposes equality and uniformity of taxation has 
no application to an occupation or license tax, but 
is limited to a direct property tax which is as-
sessed and collected in the usual way." 
The distinction between a property tax and the 
several kinds of excises mentioned in Artic~e XIII, Sec-
tion 12, Utah Constitution, is discussed in an annotation, 
103 ALR 18, entitled 'iWhat is a Property Tax as Dis-
tinguished from Excise, License, and Other Taxes." As 
pointed out therein, definitions are not much help, and 
resort is usually made to the incidents of the tax or 
charge. The annotation contains excerpts from two cases, 
Re Skelton Lead & Zinc Co.'s Gross Production Tax, 
(1921) 81 Okla. 134, 197 Pac. 495, and Reif v. Barrett 
( 1933) 355 Ill. 104, 188 NE 889, which set forth the dis-
tinctive incidents of the two types of taxes or charges 
so well that we quote therefrom: 
"The mission of a license tax, occupation tax, 
or privilege tax, or by whatever name this species 
of tax may be called, is always to regulate a 
given business, or control the right to engage in 
a given occupation. It is imposed as a condition 
or as an element of the conditions upon the right 
to exercise a given privilege, its primary mission 
being to regulate and control; and while the tax 
itself may not always be the sole condition, yet its 
payment is invariably made a part or a factor 
in the conditions upon which a business may be 
15 
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conducted, by the statute under which such tax 
is levied. • • • · 
"The basis of an occupation tax lies in the 
police power to regulate, but the basis of a prop-
erty tax is inherent in. the. very fact of govern-
. mental protection of property. The fact that the 
proceeds of an 'occupation tax' may constitute 
a portion or the sole source of revenue does not 
change its mission, nor make it any the less an 
occupation tax. Nor does the fact that an occupa-
tion tax is levied upon an ad valorem basis render 
it any the less an occupation tax. This method 
is quite frequently adopted, and in some cases 
might be the most just and reasonable measure 
for such a tax. Both kinds of taxes may be levied 
upon the same property, and both be levied upon 
an ad valorem basis, and both be valid. • • • 
"As to "\Vhether or not a given tax is an excise, 
. or a privilege and occupational, or a property· tax, 
is ordinarily not difficult of solution. They are 
- essentially different types of tax, with no infringe-
ment or overlapping of one upon the other .. Their 
character and their objects are vastly different. 
A property tax is levied merely for the purpose of 
raising revenue, and is levied against property. 
It does not seek or in an wise attempt to control 
the use, operation, or regulation of the property. 
When the tax is raised, the n1ission of the prop-
erty tax has been fulfilled. A property tax has 
, nothing whatever to do with the question of privi-
. Jege, license, or pennission. On the other hand, 
an occupation tax has one of two missions: Either 
to regulate and control a given business or occu-
pation, or to impose a tax for the privilege of 
exercising, undertaking, or operating a given occu-
pation, trade, or profession. Its effect is to license 
16 
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. a. person engaged: in_ a given railing_ or. occupa-
tion. A license in fOI:H1 may not be issued to a tax-
payer, but the payment of the tax is the license 
under the authority of ·the state to engage in such 
occupation. Regulation is not a necessary adjunc.t 
of an occupation tax. It Inay or it may not be. The 
paynlent of the tax itself is a condition precedent 
to the privilege of carrying en a business or oc-
cupation. The payment of the tax is made manda-
tory, by the act creating it, upon the right of the 
individual to follow the given .uccupation. An oc-
cupation tax may be levied under the general 
police powers of the state, where its purpose is 
to regulate or control a given -ee.cup.atioll, or it 
may be levied under the general sovereign power 
of the state, where its sole purpose is to raise 
revenue. Under which power it is levied makes no 
difference as to the character of the tax.'' 
The rule is stated thus in 33 American Jurispru-
dence, p. 326, § 3, "Licenses" : 
"In the 1nain, the distinction between a prop-
erty tax and a license or privilege tax imposed. 
for revenue is that the function of the property 
tax is to raise revenue by virtue of the fact that 
the property is within the jurisdiction of the 
taxing power, and no condition or restriction is 
imposed thereby upon the use of the property 
taxed, while the license or privilege tax, even 
though also passed to raise revenue, is imposed 
upon the right to exercise a privilege, and its 
payment is made a condition to the exercise, or 
continuance in the exercise, of the privilege, busi-
ness, or vocation involved. Altho-qgh a property 
tax may constitute a burden upon a business to 
the extent of the tax, a license or occupation tax 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
may, if not paid, and with its,-ancillary provi~ions, 
bring to an end the business altogether." 
Through Title 7, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as 
amended, the Legislature has undertaken to supervise 
and regulate the banking business in this state. r_ro pay 
the costs of this service, it has established the financial 
institutions fund, consisting of fees paid by institutions 
under the supervision of the banking department which, 
for purposes of this case are based on aggregate assets 
of the institutions. The statutes dealing with this fund, 
Sections 7-1-11, 7-1-11X, and 7-3~6, Utah Code Annotated, 
' are an integral part of the banking code, and, while there 
is no express provision that the bank commissioner may 
revoke approval of a bank's right to do business for non-
payment of such fees, we believe such authority may be 
inferred. Section 7-1-11, Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
provides: 
"All financial institutions under the super-
vision of the state banking department of the 
state of Utah shall pay to the bank commissioner 
of the state of Utah the fees for the cost of super-
vision and exan1ination according to the follow-
ing schedule * * * ." 
There is no right in anyone to engage in the banking 
business; rather, there is merely a privilege or franchise, 
which may be granted by the legislature on its terms. 
Pue et al. v. Hood, Commissioner of Banks, et al., 22 
SE 2d 896, 222 N. C. 310 (1942), and Engel v. O'Malley, 
et al., (1911) 219 U. S. 128, 31 S. Ct. 190, 55 L. Ed. 12R. 
The Utah Legislature has seen fit to regulate and restrict 
18 
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the busine.ss·.of bankiiJ.g ,in thi_s §ta_t~, perriiitt~ng.it only 
,. . . ·. . .... ·- .. 
on certain tenus, one of which is the payment~ of the fees 
for operation of the banl{ing department as set forth in 
Section 7-1-11 and 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated 1943. We 
believe, therefore, that the fees are an excise in the 
nature of a license or occupation tax, that these fees 
are governed by the provisions of Article XIII, Section 
12, Utah Constitution, and that the other provisions of 
that Article do not apply. Salt Lake City v. Christensen 
Co., supra. 
II. 
THE FEES ESTABLISHED FOR FINANCIAL INSTI-
TUTIONS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE BANKING 
DEPARTMENT DO NOT VIOLATE THE UNIFORMITY OF 
OPERATION OF LAWS REQUIRErviENT OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION. 
One of the allegations of plaintiff's complaint which 
defendants denied was that the fees established by Sec-
tions 7-1-11 and 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated 1943, were 
illegal in that those statutes violated Article I, Section 
24, of the Utah Constitution. That section states: 
"All laws of a general naure shall have uni-
form operation." 
This court, in the case of Untermeyer et al. v. State 
Tax Cmnmission et al., (1942) 102 Utah 214, 223, 129 P 
2d 881, considered this constitutional provision as it 
applied to the estate tax statutes of this State. It was 
therein stated that: 
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"As appli&d to taxation statutes such consti-
tutional provision requires only that the tax shall 
falf equally upon all similarly situated." 
The case of Salt Lake City v. Christensen Co., 
supra, considered the validity of a graduated license 
tax upon certain retail businesses adopted by Salt Lake 
City pursuant to a delegation of power by the legis-
lature. The fee there fixed was based upon the cash 
value of goods and merchandise in the possession of the 
respective merchants, and the capital employed by bank-
ers and brokers, the fees rising in amount as these figures 
mounted. To the objection that the ordinance violated 
the uniformity of laws rule, this court stated: 
"The authorities, therefore, are against the 
contention of appellant that such a classification 
offends against uniformity. The provision is not 
that the taxes must be equal as between indivi-
duals, but that they 'shall be uniform in respect 
to the class upon which they are imposed.' If a 
flat rate upon all merchants alike is uniform tax 
within the provision, why is one where greater 
equalization is effected by classifying the mer-
chants into groups, so as to bring those with 
stocks the value of which are more nearly alike, 
not also uniform? The classification is for the 
sole purpose of establishing equality, so far as 
this can be done." 
The fees established by Sections 7-1-11 and 7-3-6, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, graduated upon the basis 
of aggregate assets, "fall equally upon all similarly 
situated." They are uniform as respects t~e elass upon 
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which they are i1nposed, and therefor.e,-.. do. not. violate. 
Article I, Section :2-t, Utah Constitution. 
III. 
THE DIFFERENCE IN FEES CHARGED BRANCH 
BANKING SYSTEMS, AS OPPOSED TO NON BRANCH 
BANKS, UNDER SECTION 7-6-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1943, DOES NOT RENDER THAT SECTION VOID. 
At the trial evidence was adduced showing that, 
while plaintiff corporation, with aggregate assets in 
1949 of $11,8:28,9-19.1G, paid a total sum to the bank 
conunissioner as fees under Section 7-3-6, Utah Code 
Annotated 19-13, of $3,400.00, a bank in Salt Lake City, 
not then a hranch syste1n, with aggregate assets of 
approxjmately $80,000,000.00, paid a fee under Section 
7 -1~11, Utah Code Annotated 1943, of only $1,500.00 
( R. 3S-39). \V e presume this was offered on the theory 
that it showed an unreasonable charge upon plaintiff 
as against that n1ade upon other banks under the juris-
diction of the banking department. 
It n1ust be remembered that plaintiff 1s a branch 
or "chain" bank system. It 1nust further be reme1nbered 
that there is no right to engage in the banking business, 
but meu~ly a priYilege or franchise which may be granted 
by the legislature on its tenns. Pue et al. v. Hood, et al., 
supra, and Engel v. 0'111 alley et al., supra. Furthermore, 
branch banking may be prohibited entirely, or permitted 
on such terms as t11e legislature dee1ns fit, so long as 
they are reasonable and uniform. Bank of Italy Ll. 
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J o"-n~on, 25l.: ·Pac: 784, 200 Cal 1 · (1927) ; 1 Mie.hie,. 
Banks and· Banking 100. 
We respectfully submit that fees· provided· by Sec-
tion 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated 1943, are uniform as 
regards all banks similarly situated to plaintiff, and, in 
view of the advantages enjoyed by a branch system, and 
the differences in the work of the bank department in 
supervising and examining a branch srstem, such fees 
are not unreasonable. Furthermore, we respectfully 
submit that branch banking is a valid classification for 
puropses of fixing such fees, and that the fees thus 
arrived at are not so unmistakably arbitrary or capri-
cious and unjust that the statute must fail. True, a 
branch system may pay a larger total fee than a non-
branch banking corporation, but we submit that neither 
the classification nor the amount of the fee is unreason-
able. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court has ruled that the fees established 
by Section 7-1-11, Utah Code Annotated 1943, which 
constitute the financial institutions fund of this state, 
are void because they are in effect a direct property tax, 
and thus contravene Article XIII, Sections 2, 3, and 11, 
and Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of this State. 
It further ruled that that section and Section 7-3-6, Utah 
Code Annotated 1943, which adapts Section 7-1-11 to a 
branch banking system, do not establish a valid license, 
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ooou~tion, -or .o.ther ·form of ~Gise t~ _:such as would 
bring such fees within the provisions- :oi. Arti~le ·xrii,_· 
Section 12, Utah Constitution. With this ~~~ciu~io~ ~e­
respectfully dlffer .. 'Vhen these·: sections. are v1ew~-d in 
connection with the entire banking act, it· can be seen 
that these fees possess certain incidents which put them 
within the classification of an excise in the nature of an 
occupation or license tax, within the meaning of Article 
XIII, Section 12 of the Constitution, and remove therri 
from the provisions of that instrument which it is claimed 
are viola ted. 
The legislature has seen fit to permit branch bank-
ing in this state under certain conditions as set forth 
in Section 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated 1943. Among 
those conditions is that a branch system shall pay an 
annual fee, computed upon aggregate assets on a grad-
uated scale for assets carried at each such branch, plus 
a fee computed in the same manner upon the aggregate 
assets of the entire financial institution. This, we submit, 
the legislature has the power to do. As stated by this 
court in the case of Garrett Freight Lines v. State Tax 
Commission, (1943) 103 Utah 390, 135 P 2d 523. 
"In i1nposing a tax upon some particular 
class or group of persons, the Legislature should 
not act arbitrarily and without consideration 
of ability to pay or benefits of government re-
ceived. But unless the classification adopted by 
the Legislature is clearly and unmistakably arbi-
trary or capricious, and unjust, the enactlnent 
must be upheld. The power of. t~e courts under 
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the Constitution is not a veto power. With the 
wisdom of legislative policy the courts are not 
concerned." 
We submit that the fees charged plaintiff by the 
bank commissioner under the provisions of Section 7-3-6, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, were neither arbitrary nor 
capricious, but were based upon a classification that the 
legislature had the power to make, and, in view of the 
privileges granted plaintiff by the State, they are not 
unreasonable. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorney General 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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